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FIXING PRICE WITH YOUR VICTIM:
EFFICIENCY AND COLLUSION WITH
COMPETITOR-BASED FORMULA PRICING
CLAUSES
Joseph J. Simons*
A well-settled principle of antitrust law is that competitors cannot make a simple or "naked" agreement among themselves to fix
prices1 without violating section 1 of the Sherman Act.2 Thus, for
example, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas cannot lawfully agree that
they will charge the same price for their aircraft. However, what if
Boeing agrees with its customers that it will charge the same price
that McDonnell Douglas charges? Does this contract clause also vio* Associate, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz; formerly Associate Director, Bureau of
Competition, Federal Trade Commission; A.B. Cornell University, 1980; J.D. Georgetown
University Law Center, 1983. The views expressed in this Article are those of the author, and
do not necessarily represent the views of the Commission, any individual Commissioner, or the
Bureau of Competition. The author received helpful comments and suggestions on earlier
drafts from Steve Salop, Tom Krattenmaker, Jim Hurdle, Richard Craswell, Warren
Schwartz, and Robert Pitofsky. The author would especially like to thank Tom Krattenmaker
and Steve Salop for guidance and encouragement, without which this Article would never have
been completed. Finally, this Article was initially begun as a joint work with Steve Salop.
Even though he is cited where possible, a great many additional insights contained herein must
be attributed to him. I, of course, retain responsibility for any remaining errors.
I. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 345-48 (1982). It is
important for antitrust purposes to distinguish price-fixing agreements adopted in the context
of joint ventures or other integration of operations from the same restrictions undertaken in
isolation. Where two independent firms agree to fix prices or divide markets without more, no
integration of operations occurs, and little opportunity for the expansion of output or the enhancement of efficiency exists. In such cases, the restraints are said to be "naked." Thus, the
distinguishing feature of naked price-fixing lies in the absence of any integration of operations;
it is this absence that prevents this naked restraint from having any likely output-increasing or
efficiency-enhancing qualities and is the reason for holding such restraints illegal per se. See
Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987); Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enterps., 776 F.2d 185, 188 (7th Cir.
1985); R. BORKC, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 263-64 (1978); see also Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. at 356-57.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Section 1 provides that "[e]very contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id.
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late the Sherman Act?
The clause contained in the hypothetical Boeing contract is one

example of what can be termed "competitor-based formula pricing
clauses."' In commercial practice, these clauses appear in quite a
variety of forms, and they are used frequently in long-term con-

tracts.4 Competitor-based pricing clauses, furthermore, can be efficient as well as anticompetitive, depending on the industry structure

in which they appear. In unconcentrated industries,5 these types of
contract clauses bring the prevailing forces of the market to bear

throughout the life of long-term contracts6 and can allocate risk efficiently. In oligopolistic (or oligopsonistic) markets8 characterized by
high entry barriers, however, competitor-based formula pricing
clauses may facilitate tacit collusion and, therefore, have anticompetitive effects. 9 The clauses can create such effects mainly from their

ability to create externalities"0 and alter incentives for price
competition."
The clauses and some variants have been discussed in numerous
judicial opinions dating back to the Supreme Court's opinions in
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. 2 and InternationalSalt
Co. v. United States.' In most cases, the courts have failed to focus
on two principal characteristics of these clauses-their incentive al3. See infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text (defining competitor-based formula
pricing clauses).
4. See Clark, Price-fixing Without Collusion: An Antitrust Analysis of Facilitating
Practices After Ethyl Corp., 1983 Wis. L. REv. 887, 895-99 (discussing structural factors to
consider in evaluating facilitating practices, such as competitor-based formula pricing clauses).
5. In unconcentrated markets, "sales are distributed among many sellers and no small
number has a significant share." C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY; AN ECONOMIC
AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 25 (1959); see Clark, supra note 4, at 895.
6. Once parties sign a long-term contract, the contract determines the price for the
length of that contract and, therefore, exchanges that occur under fixed-price contracts are not
significantly influenced by prevailing marketplace conditions. Inclusion of a competitor-based
pricing clause, however, still allows prevailing market forces to affect contractual price after
the contract is signed.
7. See Salop, Practices that (Credibly) Facilitate Oligopoly Co-ordination, in NEW
DEVLOPMENTS IN THE ANALYSIS OF MARKET STRUCTURE 265, 273-78 (J. Stiglitz & G. Mathewson eds. 1986).
8. An oligopolistic market is one with few sellers so that each seller's price and output
decisions will have a noticeable effect on the other sellers in that market, as well as on the

market itself. 6 P.
9.

10.
11.
12.
13.

See
See
See
310
332

AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW

1429a, at 175 (1986).

infra, text accompanying notes 110-29.
infra text accompanying notes 29-30 (discussing externalities).
infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
U.S. 150 (1940).
U.S. 392 (1947).
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tering and externality creating properties. 4 Consequently, courts
have not properly analyzed the clauses, despite the fact that they
may have reached the correct results in some cases. The Federal

Trade Commission is the only judicial body to expressly consider
these two properties. The Commission's decision in In re Ethyl
Corp."5 considered one type of competitor-based formula pricing
clause, the most-favored nation clause (MFN), 6 under section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act.' 7 In holding MFN clauses illegal, the Commission, although reversed on appeal, 8 generally relied
on the incentive altering characteristics of the clauses and noted the
existence of externalities in its analysis. 19
In contrast to the Federal Trade Commission, most courts and
scholars refer to these clauses as "price protection" clauses,20 presumably because they protect the party desiring the clause from un-

favorable price changes. This Article will demonstrate, however, that
these clauses can have the opposite result. In certain instances, they
have a tendency to cause the price change that was sought to be

avoided and create the same effect as a horizontal conspiracy to fix
price. 2 ' Thus, the contract with the "victim" can substitute for the
horizontal contract or agreement.
This Article considers competitor-based formula pricing clauses
in a generic fashion and attempts to determine the general condi14. See, e.g., id. at 394 n.5; United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150
(1940); Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 479 F. Supp. 536 (D.N.M. 1979),
affd, 728 F.2d 1555 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. General Elec. Co., 1977-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 61,659 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Pure Oil Co., 25 F.P.C. 383, 386 n.1 (1961), aff'd, Pure Oil
Co. v. FPC, 299 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1962); In re Ethyl Corp., 101 F.T.C. 425 (1983), rev'd sub
nom. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984).
15. 101 F.T.C. 425 (1983), rev'd sub nom. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729
F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984).
16. Most-favored-nation clauses are "contract provisions which require offering the benefits of a lower price to all customers if it is offered to any." Ethyl Corp., 101 F.T.C. at 628.
These clauses may also be referred to as "most-favored-customer pricing," see Cooper, MostFavored-CustomerPricing and Tacit Collusion, 17 RAND J. ECON 377 (1986), or "most-favored-buyer clauses," see 6 P. AREEDA, supra note 8, 1435e, at 229-30.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
18. See E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984).
19. 101 F.T.C. at 630-32.
20. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES § 3.44, reprinted in 2
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,103, at 20,563 (1984) [hereinafter MERGER GUIDELINES]; 6 P.
AREEDA, supra note 8, 1 1435e, at 229-31.
21. A horizontal conspiracy is an agreement among competitors to restrain trade, as
opposed to a vertical conspiracy, which is an agreement among members at different levels of
production, such as manufacturers and their suppliers. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405
U.S. 596. 609 (1971).
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tions under which such pricing schemes create anticompetitive effects. The Article attempts to identify the common features of competitor-based formula pricing clauses that create anticompetitive
effects and under what circumstances these effects become pronounced. Finally, the Article analyzes the clauses in the context of
section 1 of the Sherman Act, and concludes that in instances where
competitor-based formula pricing creates anticompetitive outcomes,
this practice can and should be prohibited as contrary to the Sherman Act.
Section I of this Article discusses various economic aspects of
long-term contracts.22 Section II defines competitor-based formula
pricing clauses and provides examples of the clauses.23 Section III
presents the efficiencies of the clauses,24 and a discussion of the anticompetitive effects follows in Section IV.25 Section V analyzes the
clauses in the context of section 1 of the Sherman Act.28 Finally,
Section VI discusses In re Ethyl Corp.,27 the only case to date which
properly analyzes the effects of competitor-based formula pricing
clauses.28
I.

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LONG-TERM CONTRACTS

In order to understand how competitor-based formula pricing
clauses affect competition, an appreciation of some of the economic
principles of long-term contracts is helpful. One of the primary concepts underlying the making of any contract is that a lawful contract
embodies a voluntary exchange, which benefits both parties to the
exchange. To illustrate, suppose A has goods worth $100 to him, but
worth $200 to B. It is economically advantageous to both parties if A
exchanges his goods to B at any price between $100 and $200. Assuming both A and B realize their respective positions, it is economically rational that such an exchange occurs. Social welfare will also
be increased by the exchange. Assume the sale occurs at $150. Prior
to the sale A had $100 worth of goods and B had $150 in cash, for a
total value to society of $250. After the sale, A had $150 and B had
goods worth $200 to him, for a total value to society of $350. Social
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
F.2d 128
28.

See
See
See
See
See
101
(2d
See

infra notes
infra notes
infra notes
infra notes
infra notes
F.T.C. 425
Cir. 1984).
infra notes

29-40 and accompanying text.
41-49 and accompanying text.
50-57 and accompanying text.
58-145 and accompanying text.
146-213 and accompanying text.
(1983), rev'd sub nom. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729
214-32 and accompanying text.
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wealth, therefore, has increased from $250 to $350.29

This analysis, however, may be flawed since it does not consider
the contract's effects upon third parties.30 For example, suppose performance of the hypothetical contract between A and B caused pollution to C's property, which would leave C with $150 in clean-up
costs. Although A and B will still desire to go forward with their
contract, the costs borne by others may make the agreement socially
undesirable. Assume that prior to the contract A's goods were worth
$100 to him, B had $150 in cash, and C had nothing, for a total of
$250. After the exchange, A had $150, B had $200, and C lost $150,
for a social aggregate of $200-a loss of $50. The effect of A's and
B's contract on C is termed an externality. That is, the agreement
between A and B has effects, or externalities, on individuals who are
not parties to the contract. Thus, voluntary exchanges will increase
societal welfare only in the absence of externalities.
Many competitor-based formula pricing clauses are embedded
in long-term contracts. 31 One might ask why parties would adopt a
long-term contract rather than a series of short-term agreements.
First, and most obvious, is the concern with transactions costs. 32 It
can be significantly less time consuming and costly to negotiate one
contract covering, for example, ten years, than to negotiate ten individual one-year contracts. Second, depending on one's degree of risk
aversion, the ability to assure oneself of a steady source of supply or
the continued existence of a buyer may prove valuable.33 Third, the
long-term contract allows the parties to allocate the risk of price and
cost changes in an efficient way. 34 Finally, long-term contracts help
to avoid the problem of opportunism.35 Opportunism includes the
29. See H. KRONMAN & R. POSNER. THE EcONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 1-2 (1979)
(evaluating a similar example).
30. See id. at 2 (noting that this example ignores third parties).
31. See H. Broadman & M. Toman, Non-Price Provisions in Long-term Natural Gas
Contracts 5 (January 1984) (unpublished manuscript) (on file at Hofstra Law Review) (discussing transaction costs and long-term contracts in the natural gas industry).
32. Id. at 5.
33. See id. This factor is important in cases which require large initial outlays of capital
and a long run flow of revenue to make the investment economically feasible. In gas production, for example, the sizeable costs of drilling, equipping, and connecting a gas well to a
pipeline system are mostly fixed and must be incurred before a well can be brought into production. Id. at 5-6.
34. See Mulherin, Complexity in Long-term Contracts: An Analysis of Natural Gas
ContractualProvisions,2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 105, 114 (1986) (commenting on the theories of
risk allocation in natural gas contracts).
35. Klein, Crawford & Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the
Competitive ContractingProcess, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 303 (1978).
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ability of one party to take advantage of another party after they
have entered into a contractual relationship. 6 For example, a party
may seek to rent an asset which is very expensive to remove once it
is installed, such as a pipeline. If the parties agree only to a one-year
contract, the buyer will have substantially more bargaining leverage
when the parties sit down to negotiate the second one-year contract
ex post, than the buyer did when negotiating the initial contract ex
ante. The buyer knows that, at possible subsequent transactions, the
seller intends to deal with him above all other buyers because of the
great expense involved in removing the asset. The buyer, therefore,
would be able to extort a lower price through his opportunistic behavior. A long-term contract avoids the possibility of such ex post
conduct by requiring all of the bargaining to occur ex ante. That is,
all of the negotiation occurs before the asset becomes specialized
to a
37
particular buyer and, therefore, all buyers compete equally.
As mentioned above, the parties to a long-term contract have a
mutual economic interest in efficiently allocating the risk of future
market price changes that occur during the term of the contract. Of
even greater significance, however, is that the manner in which risk
is allocated, and to whom it is allocated, can alter the incentives of
the parties and result in more or less efficient outcomes. Indeed, alternative contractual structures dealing with price changes may be
characterized by their risk allocation and incentive creating
properties.
Two common contract provisions are fixed-price and cost-plus
price setting clauses. The fixed-price contract, however, offers superior incentive properties since it increases the seller's incentive to efficiently minimize costs. This incentive arises because the seller absorbs the entire effect of cost increases and enjoys all the benefits of
cost reductions. In contrast, a cost-plus contract compromises the
seller's incentives to minimize costs because he receives no benefit
36. Opportunism is behavior driven by self-interest that is a form of reneging on a contract. Id. at 298. Regardless of how carefully contracts are drawn to consider all contingencies,

the risk of opportunistic behavior (i.e. the contract not being honored in some manner) is
present. Id. at 297-98; see also 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 26 (1975) (noting that "[o]pportunism extends the conventional assumption that economic agents are guided by considerations of self-interest to make allowance
for strategic behavior." (emphasis in original)); see also H. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, supra
note 29, at 4 (discussing the need for sanctions under contract law where extended exchanges
create "strategic opportunities that parties might try to exploit").
37. For a more detailed analysis of opportunism, see 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 36, at
26-30; Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 35, at 298 (exploring the threat of post-contractual opportunistic behavior as it occurs with regard to rental arrangements).
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from reducing costs.38 Economists label such a disincentive to reduce
costs "a moral hazard." 39 Only the buyer gains from cost-reducing
measures in the cost-plus contract. Therefore, the fixed-price con-

tract can be characterized as allocating risk of future market price
increases to the seller, thereby maintaining its incentives to reduce
cost. The cost-plus contract, on the other hand, can be characterized

as allocating the risk of price increases to the buyer, thereby reducing the seller's incentives to minimize costs."'
To summarize, the basic economic contract principles important
to this analysis are that contracts: (1) result from voluntary exchanges that maximize social welfare in the absence of externalities,
(2) can alter incentives of the parties, and (3) can be more or less
efficient depending on their structure and the manner in which they
shift risk. These basic contract principles provide the necessary foundation to fully understand the effects of competitor-based formula
pricing clauses on competition.
II.

COMPETITOR-BASED FORMULA PRICING CLAUSES DEFINED

Competitor-based formula pricing clauses peg the contract price
to the prices charged or paid by the competitors of one or both of the
parties to the contract. They are generally designed to bring the pre38. See 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 36, at 84-85 (discussing risk-bearing and incentives,
and noting that risk can be shifted by use of a cost-plus contract). A price determined by the
seller's costs is a good proxy for the market price if the market is competitive and the seller is
efficient. It is not a perfect proxy, however, because demand effects are not taken into account.
39. See id. at 13-16. Professor Williamson defines the insurance industry "moral hazard" problem as the circumstance in which insureds with post-control knowledge of costs (their
own risk aversion practices) exploit that information opportunistically, while the insuror could
obtain the same information only by bearing a much greater cost. Id. The insurance industry
provides an example of measures taken to minimize the "moral hazard" problem by the use of
deductibles. Id. If the insured suffers no monetary injury from getting into an automobile
accident, he or she is less likely to drive carefully, so that allocating cost to the insured by
means of a deductible avoids the "moral hazard" problem by giving the insured an incentive to
drive carefully. See id.
40. Id. This shortcoming can be combatted more efficiently through a price escalator
provision to be triggered by a cost index that is not under the seller's control, yet is highly
correlated with the market price. For example, if in a long-term contract for the purchase of
airplanes, production of one plane consisted solely of 1 ton of aluminum, 100 worker hours,
and 50 kilowatt hours of electricity, then the price might be escalated by a formula that
weighs the wholesale price index for aluminum sheet, the average hourly wage of skilled workers, and the wholesale price index of electricity. Such indexed contracts are more efficient
because they allow the contracting parties to allocate the risk of price changes to the buyer
and, at the same time, maintain the seller's incentive to minimize costs. In addition, cost-plus
contracts are more difficult to monitor since it is difficult to verify the seller's costs to ensure
that they are not being overstated. A cost-index, on the other hand, is easily verified since it is
likely to be derived from publicly accessible information.
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vailing forces of the market to bear throughout the life of long-term
contracts. 4 ' For example, if the parties sign a long-term contract
with a set price, exchanges occurring under that contract are taken
out of the "spot" market of short-term exchanges or contracts. Inclusion of a competitor-based formula pricing clause would represent an
attempt to allow those market forces to continue to affect the contract price even after the contract is signed. Adjusting the price in a
long-term contract to reflect current market prices gives the parties
the proper short-run price signals."2
Perhaps the most obvious way to bring these market forces to
bear on the contract price, ex post, is by setting the contract price
equal to the spot market price.43 Thus, even though a contract may
be in its twentieth year, the buyer would pay the current spot market
price. The parties in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.4 4 used
a similar arrangement.4 5 In Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., the defendants
maintained long-term contracts with some jobbers (distributors) and
pegged the price of any particular oil shipment to the spot market
prices appearing in a specified trade journal on the day of
shipment.46
In industries where transaction prices are not routinely reported,
however, other proxies for the market price must be found. In competitive industries, the recent prices charged to other buyers by the
seller or the seller's competitors may suffice. Alternatively, the recent
prices paid by the contracting buyer or other buyers can be used.
Thus, for example, in a contract with a "most-favored nation clause"
(MFN), the contract price is tied to the price offered to other parties
by either the contracting seller or the contracting buyer. 47 A "meet41.

See Mulherin, supra note 34, at 1I1 (noting that in the natural gas industry,

"[tihese adjustment provisions have been structured to allow price response to new information
within an otherwise long-term agreement ....").
42. Goldberg & Erickson, Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-term Contracts:A
Case Study of Petroleum Coke, 30 J.L. & ECON. 369, 387 (1987).
43. See infra note 46 (discussing "spot market" pricing).
44. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).

45. Id. at 166.
46. Id. at 192-94. There was, however, no central exchange or market price for spot
market transactions. Each sale was the result of individual negotiations between a refiner and
its customers for delivery in the immediate future. Id. at 193. The trade journal reported the
range of these transactions daily and the journal quotations were known as the "spot market"
price. Id. The shipments occurring under the long-term contracts were in turn determined by
these spot prices. Id.
47. See Salop, supra note 7, at 273-78 (discussing examples of MFNs). MFN clauses
are contract provisions which require the seller to offer the benefit of a lower price given to one
customer to all customers if the lower price is offered to any. In re Ethyl Corp., 101 F.T.C.
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ing competition clause" (MCC), on the other hand, ties the contract
price to prices offered by other buyers or sellers and puts the burden
of searching out such prices on one of the contracting parties.48 Numerous other variations and combinations of these provisions are also
possible.49
In unconcentrated markets, competitor-based formula pricing
clauses are better reflectors of market forces than clauses that index
the contract price only to costs, because competitor-based formula
pricing clauses take into account changes in demand as well as
changes in cost or supply. The clauses do so by pegging the contract
price to the spot market or competitor prices which are determined
jointly by supply and demand factors. Since index based clauses only
take account of costs, the influence of demand factors is ignored.
III.

EFFICIENCIES OF COMPETITOR-BASED FORMULA PRICING
CLAUSES

In addition to bringing the prevailing market forces to bear
throughout the life of long-term contracts, competitor-based formula
pricing clauses are efficient in several other aspects as well. As the
next Section demonstrates, however, the characteristics of the
clauses may be adversely affected in concentrated markets. The discussion here, therefore, analyzes the clauses in the context of unconcentrated markets. The additional benefits provided by these clauses
fall basically into the following categories: (1) allocation of risk; (2)
insurance against competitive disadvantage; (3) maintenance of incentives to minimize costs; and (4) earlier consummation of
transactions.
A. Allocation of Risk
In a long-term contract, both parties face the risk that the market price will change at some point during the contract term. Indeed,
the competitor-based formula pricing clause is designed specifically
in contemplation of such changes. As noted above, the parties have a
mutual interest in efficiently allocating the risk of future rrice
425, 470 (1983). rev'd sub nom. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 134
(2d Cir. 1984). MFN clauses in sales contracts provide "the buyer with insurance protection
against the contingency that the seller may offer a lower price to another customer." Salop,
supra note 7, at 273.
48. See Salop, supra note 7, at 279. The MCC provides the buyer with insurance
against lost opportunity in the situation where the buyer would have been offered a better price
by the seller's competitor. Id.
49. See id. at 274-79, 280-82.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1989

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 3

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:599

changes that occur during the contract term. If both the buyer and
the seller are risk neutral, they will be indifferent to shifting risk? °
Competitor-based formula pricing clauses can accommodate
risk shifting quite easily. In Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., for example,
the contract price was determined by the spot market price for gasoline as published in a trade journal.5 1 If the buyers of the gasoline
had been risk averse and wanted to avoid the effects of unfavorable
price increases, the contract could have been written to reflect their
desire; the parties could have pegged the contract price to the existing spot price with a proviso that, should the spot price rise, the
contract price would remain constant. Thus, if the spot price fell, the
contract price would have also fallen, but if the spot price rose, the
contract price would not have risen correspondingly. Obviously, the
buyer would have to pay a premium for this insurance protection.
MCCs and MFNs can also be designed to shift risk. Indeed,
both types of clauses are structured in most cases to accomplish risk
shifting. For example, an MFN clause shifts the risk of a price increase to the seller by providing as follows: "If at any time before
buyer takes delivery of said generator, seller offers a lower price for
a comparable size and quality generator to any
other purchaser,
52
buyer.
to
price
lower
the
offer
also
will
seller
By using the contracting seller's price as a proxy for the market
price, the MFN clause allows the buyer to enjoy the benefits of a
price decline, but not to suffer the harm of a price increase. The
seller absorbs that risk and, therefore, this type of clause is termed
an MFN on the seller's side.
MFNs are also common on the buyer's side.53 These clauses tie
50. That is, either party would be willing to bear the risk in exchange for an actuarially
equivalent price premium. In other instances, however, both parties will benefit by shifting
risk. In such cases, the cost to one party of absorbing risk is less than the benefit conferred on
the other party from avoiding the risk. Therefore, there is room for a deal.
51. 310 U.S. 150, 193 (1940).
52. Clauses of this type were used by General Electric and Westinghouse during the
1960's and were the subject of a consent decree with the Justice Department in 1977. See
United States v. General Elec. Co., 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,659, at 72,716 (E.D. Pa.

1977).
53.

MFNs on the buyer's side are used widely throughout the oil and gas industry. See

U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., NATURAL GAS PRODUCER/PURCHASER CONTRACTS AND THEIR POTENTIAL IMPACTS ON THE NATURAL GAS MARKET, AND

ANALYSIS OF THE NATURAL GAS POLICY ACT AND SEVERAL ALTERNATIVES (pt. II) (1982)
[hereinafter NATURAL GAS PRODUCER/PURCHASER CONTRACTS] (reporting studies that show

an increase in the use of buyer protection clauses, which allow the buyer to refuse to purchase
gas or to reduce the price because of adverse market conditions); Hughes, Indefinite Escalators: 1985, Does FERC Have a "Stairway" Down?, 4 ENERGY L.J. 189 (1983) (discussing
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the contract price to prices paid by the buyer to other sellers and

shift the risk of price decreases to the buyer. They require the buyer
to pay the contracting seller a higher price if he offers a higher price
to another seller. The following is an example of an MFN on the
buyer's side:
If at any time or times after the date of this Agreement Buyer...
shall purchase from any other seller gas from [wells within specified counties], at a price per one thousand (1,000) cubic feet higher
than the price at the time payable hereunder, the price payable to
seller... for gas hereunder shall be immediately increased to equal
such higher price paid to such other seller.54

MCCs that shift risk to the seller generally provide that if another seller offers a lower price during the term of the contract, the
buyer will get the benefit of the lower price.55
B.

Insurance Against Competitive Disadvantage

One aspect of the risk allocation function of competitor-based
formula pricing clauses is that it can offer insurance against competitive disadvantage where competitors also buy the input. CompetitorFERC power to curtail use of MFNs in the natural gas industry); H. Broadman & M. Toman,
supra note 31, at 15.
54. Pure Oil Co., 25 F.P.C. 383, 386 n.1 (1961) (emphasis added), aft'd, Pure Oil Co. v.
FPC, 299 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1962).
55. MCCs also are widely used in the oil and gas industry. See NATURAL GAS PRODUCER/PURCHASER CONTRACTS, supranote 53, at 62. MCCs, however, are often referred to in
this industry as "third-party most favored nation clauses," whereas MFN's are often referred
to in the oil and gas industry as "two-party most favored nation clauses." Generically, they are
both part of what the industry terms "indefinite escalator clauses." See id.; H. Broadman &
M. Toman, supra note 31, at 12.
A common variant of the MCC is the "meet or release clause" (MOR). This clause is
basically identical to the meeting competition clause except that the seller is not obligated to
lower its price. The clause provides that the seller has the option of reducing its price to meet
the lower price and if it does not reduce the price, the buyer is released from the contract. The
following is an example of an MOR:
If at any time during the term of this [contract] a general reduction in [the] price
of... salt ... shall be made, said [buyer] shall give [the seller] an opportunity to
provide ... salt at any such competitive price quoted, and in case [the seller] shall
fail or be unable to do so, [the buyer] ... shall have the privilege of ... [purchasing] salt in the open market until such time as the [seller] shall furnish ... salt at
the said competitive price.
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 394 n.5 (1947).
MCCs, like MFNs, see supra note 53 and accompanying text, can also occur on the
buyer's side. Such MCCs would simply provide that if the buyer received a better price from
another seller, the contracting seller would have to match the lower price or, under the MOR
clause, release the buyer from the contract.
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based formula pricing clauses accomplish this by insuring that the
firm using the clause pays no more for the input than its competitors.
With regard to the MFN, for example, if the contracting seller gives
the competitor a lower price, it must give the same low price to the
contracting buyer as well. With the MCC, if other sellers are giving
lower prices, the contracting buyer will not be disadvantaged vis-avis its competitors who buy from those other sellers. The contracting
seller must give it the same lower price its competitors are getting.
C. Maintenance of Incentives to Minimize Cost
Assuming two parties enter into a long-term contract and want
to shift the risk of either a price increase or decrease, competitorbased formula pricing clauses may efficiently accomplish the parties'
goals. There are several ways to shift the risk of price increases, and
some ways are more efficient than others. For example, price escalator clauses based on the wholesale price index of various inputs are
more efficient than cost-plus contracts, since the latter reduce incentives of the seller to minimize cost, whereas the former retain those
incentives. 6
Competitor-based formula pricing clauses can also shift risk
while maintaining the desired incentives to minimize costs. In essence, they function just like the price escalator clauses based on a
wholesale price index. That is, they use a proxy for the market price
that is not within the seller's control, but which still highly correlates
to the market price. Indeed, competitor-based formula pricing
clauses can be more efficient than clauses based on wholesale indices.
If the seller's actions do not affect the price, its incentive to behave efficiently and minimize cost will be maintained. In a competitive market, all firms are price takers and, therefore, not even a
seller's own price is within its control. The spot market price is certainly not within the control of any one firm in a competitive market.
As discussed above, competitor-based formula pricing clauses provide better proxies for the market price than prices based on a
wholesale index because the latter does not account for shifts in demand, which can affect the market price. Thus, competitor-based
formula pricing clauses can shift risk more efficiently because they
do so while maintaining the seller's incentives to minimize cost and
providing better proxies for the market price.
56. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
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D. Earlier Consummation of Transactions due to Elimination of
Risk of Price Change
Competitor-based formula pricing clauses on the seller's side
may convince customers to make purchases sooner than they would
in the absence of the clauses. In a volatile market, the buyer may be
reluctant to buy earlier rather than later because it may expect a
price decline in the contract period and may be delaying its purchase
in anticipation that the purchase price reflects that decline. The
clause should reduce the reluctance to buy early on in the contract
term because if the market price falls, the buyer gets the benefit of
the lower price. Thus, the clause encourages the buyer to purchase
57
earlier than it otherwise would.
IV.

ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMPETITOR-BASED FORMULA
PRICING CLAUSES

This Section examines the anticompetitive effects of competitorbased formula pricing clauses, beginning with a review of cartel theory and a discussion of the conditions under which firms may become interdependent. The discussion of cartel theory sets up the subsequent analysis of the theory of facilitating practices. Cartel and
facilitating practice theories are then applied to competitor-based
formula pricing clauses.
A. Cartel Theory
A cartel arises when the individual firms in an industry join together to reduce the industry's output and increase prices 58 in the
same fashion as a monopolist. Thus, a successful cartel is able to
achieve the same results as a monopoly-setting price above margi59
nal cost.
Cartels, however, are inherently unstable for several reasons.
First, the parties to a conspiracy may have different ideas about the
appropriate price levels and market shares.6 0 Such differences may
make it difficult to reach an agreement all of the members will re57.

While theoretically plausible, there is no known empirical validation of the signifi-

cance of this factor.
58.

The simplest cartel is an agreement among competing sellers to sell all their output

at the same price. H.

HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW

83 (1985).

59. See id. at 84 (comparing a cartel's determination of the profit-maximizing price with
the single-firm monopoly's determination).
60. See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
171 (2d ed. 1980); 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 36, at 241; Salop, supra note 7, at 266.
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spect 1 Furthermore, if the products are significantly differentiated,
the cartel members will have to agree on a method to account for the
differences. 2
Second, the cartel members must devise a way to increase price
from the competitive level to the monopoly price.6 3 No member will
want to be the first to raise price, since it would lose customers and
goodwill during the time it had a higher price." Both of the abovementioned difficulties will be recurring concerns. The cartel will have
to set new prices periodically due to changes in cost and market conditions. Each time a price increase is in order, the members will have
to agree upon a price and devise a means to attain it. 5
Third, once the cartel members have agreed on price and have
attained that price, there is the problem of maintaining the price.6
Each cartel member has an incentive to cheat or shade the cartel
price.6 7 By lowering price, an individual firm will increase its sales
and make greater profits because the cartel price is above marginal
cost.6 8

An additional problem with maintaining the cartel exists. If the
cartel accomplishes its goal of high profits for its members, firms
outside the industry will be induced to enter to obtain the high profits themselves.6 9 Unless barriers to entry are present, the cartel will
have to admit the new entrants or it will not be able to maintain the
supracompetitive price.y Otherwise, the entrants will undercut the
61. See F. SCHERER, supra note 60, at 171; Salop, supra note 7, at 266.
62. See F. SCHERER, supra note 60, at 200-01; Salop, supra note 7, at 266. Scherer
outlines four broad differences among apparently similar products. First, stable interfirm differences in product quality may exist, which requires coordinating both the general price level
and the differential between the products. Id. at 201. Second, when sellers are located at varying distances from buyers and transportation costs are relatively high, a very complex price
structure may be required to assure that the sellers' prices will be the same to each buyer. Id.
Third, product qualities may be dynamically unstable, as in the fashion goods industry, which
would probably require frequent changes and thus an increased number of agreements on
price. Id Fourth, complex products are often sold on a custom-made basis where no two orders
are identical, making agreement extremely difficult. Id.
63. See Salop, supra note 7, at 266.
64. See id. at 268.
65. See id. at 266-68.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 269.
68. See F. SCHERER, supra note 60, at 172; Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, in EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS AND ANrITRusT LAW 124 (T. Calvani & J. Siegfried eds. 1979).
69. See Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L.
REv. 1562, 1569 (1969) (discussing the need to create barriers to the entrance of new firms
into the market to protect the cartel).

70. Id.
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cartel price and take away the cartel's customers. If the entrants are
admitted, however, the monopoly profits will have to be spread more
thinly.71 Furthermore, if the cartel eventually breaks down, the market will have too many firms which will result in "ruinous" competition and numerous failed firms.72 Thus, even if firms in an industry
can agree on a price level as well as how to attain and maintain the
price, their efforts will be wasted unless barriers to entry exist. Accordingly, a cartel is less likely to exist without entry barriers.
The problems discussed above are exacerbated when the Sherman Act7 3 is considered. The Act prohibits contracts, combination,
and conspiracies in restraint of trade, such as cartel agreements.74
Even where cartels are legal, the difficulties of maintaining them are
substantial.7" It is difficult enough to agree on a price where the parties are able to meet and negotiate openly. The Sherman Act makes
it necessary for the parties to meet or correspond secretly, 76 thus creating a higher degree of distrust and uncertainty. A court will not
enforce these secret agreements and their stability is often
uncertain. 77
As the prior discussion indicates, however, the firms in a cartel
should realize that cheating will lead to the collapse of the cartel and
lower profits for all. Nevertheless, strong reasons for cheating remain. First, it may be possible to cheat secretly and, as a result,
prevent retaliation long enough to make cheating worthwhile." Second, a firm might cheat because it lacks confidence that the cartel
will endure and sees no advantage in foregoing the short-term gains
71.

id.

72. Id. The possibility of a breakdown of the cartel, which would result in "ruinous"
competition, can itself deter entry. However, potential entrants would be deterred only if they
first recognized that a cartel was in operation as opposed to attributing high profits to a tempo-

rary disequilibrium. Moreover, individual potential entrants could enter and exist under the
pricing umbrella of the cartel without causing a breakdown, provided that their capacity was

sufficiently small. Small potential entrants may thus enter in the hope that a sufficient number
of other potential entrants will refrain from entry. See C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 5,

at 195-96.
73.
74.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
Id. § 1.

75. See Rattner, Oil Price Pact Called Unlikely, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1981, at Dl, col.
3 (noting that OPEC had difficulty agreeing on price).
76.

See Posner, supra note 69, at 1570 (noting that cartel participants are limited to

clandestine methods).
77. See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 58, at 83 (commenting on the instability of cartel
agreements).
78. See 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 36, at 242; Salop, supra note 7, at 269; Posner,
supra note 69, at 1570.
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for the long-term gains it considers unlikely.79 Additionally, a firm
may cheat deliberately because it thinks that other firms in the cartel are cheating.80
Once a cartel is formed, the cartel price is attained, and a bar-

rier to entry is in place, the basic ingredient to successful maintenance is to create the belief that any cheating will be met with swift

retaliation.8 Of course, the best way to create such a belief is to
make it a reality. Indeed, the reality may be required if cheating can
occur inadvertently. 2 This will require methods to detect cheaters
and guarantee that at least some members will retaliate quickly
enough so that the cheater will not significantly increase its market
share and profits. The existence of the Sherman Act usually makes
the ability to create the requisite certainty difficult or impossible.

It is possible in some instances, however, that such certainty can
exist purely as the result of interdependence among participating
firms.8 3 That is, the responses and conduct among firms in an industry are so clear to each other that each takes into account the expected price decisions of its rivals and decides to charge a noncompetitive price, making formal agreement between the firms is

unnecessary.' Such a situation could arise in a market characterized
by many of the following conditions: (1) few firms,8 5 (2) a relatively
homogeneous product,8 6 (3) frequent small sales,87 (4) few big buy79. Posner, supra note 69, at 1570.
80. Clark, supra note 4, at 892.
81. See generally Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory of Self Enforcing
Collusion, 87 COL. L. REv. 295, 295-98 (1987) (discussing the enforcement of collusive agreements by cartel members).
82. Cf. Posner, supra note 69, at 1570 (stating that "[a] seller might cheat inadvertently
because of a mistake in computation or a failure of communication of the agreed price.").
83. See Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 662 (1962).
84. Experimental evidence indicates that such interdependence is especially likely to result where firms must continually interact with each other and where the last interaction is
unknown. See R. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 125-32 (1984) (discussing the
improvement of cooperation based on experiments involving the Prisoner's Dilemma).
85. Interdependence can exist only where few firms are present because as the number
of firms gets larger, it gets increasingly more difficult to calculate and keep track of each firm's
activities. See Clark, supra note 4, at 895.
86. A relatively homogeneous product is helpful because the converse, differentiated
products, would require each firm to make additional calculations and predictions of rivals'
actions. Firms would have to reach a consensus on price spreads between differentiated products. See id. at 896.
87. Frequent small sales enable firms to establish credibility of retaliation easily by repeatedly matching lower prices. Sales of small dollar amounts aid in creating interdependence
by decreasing the gains to be made from cheating. A firm would have to cheat on a large
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ers,88 (5) good information concerning rivals' prices (e.g. posted
prices, availability of price, or quantity information through reporting services), 89 (6) a single delivered price,90 (7) barriers to entry,91
and (8) firms competing in multiple product or geographic markets. 2 Not all of these conditions must be present for collusion, tacit
or overt, to occur. Indeed, tacit collusion appears to have occurred in
an industry with a highly customized product, very infrequent large
sales, and mostly large buyers.93
In order to consider how the theory of interdependence fits into
cartel theory, it is helpful to conceptualize both theories in the following manner. Assume that a market with interdependent firms is
at one end of the spectrum and a competitive market is at the other
end. In between, markets may contain some of the necessary condi-

tions for interdependence to exist. It would be easier for firms to
form an overt cartel in these intermediate markets than in a competitive market. The Sherman Act prohibits such an agreement, however, and as a result, the degree of certainty of rivals' actions necessary to attain a noncompetitive price is not present. Although the
portion of sales to make cheating profitable, thereby increasing the chance of detection. See
Clark, supra note 4, at 898-99.
88. Big buyers may have power of their own and may be able to pay off suppliers to
keep prices down.
89. Good information concerning competitors' actions allows oligopolists to insure that
cheaters can be retaliated against rapidly. See Clark, supra note 4, at 900-01.
90. The single delivered price contributes to interdependence because where f.o.b. prices
and delivered prices exist simultaneously, firms may be able to hide price cuts by giving discounts on transportation. See Shenefield, Antitrust Division Memorandum on Identification
and Challenge of Parallel Pricing Practices in Concentrated Industries, Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 874, at F-2 (July 27, 1978) (citing examples of cases dealing with price
standardization such as "delivered price systems" and "standard freight rates").
91. Barriers to entry must be present to prevent more firms from entering the industry,
and thereby destroying the conditions necessary for interdependence to exist. See Clark, supra
note 4, at 899.
92. When firms compete in multiple product or geographic markets, they are better able
to establish reputations which makes signaling more understandable and reciprocity more
likely. Where the number of interactions between firms is large, it is easier for cooperative,
noncompetitive outcomes to emerge. See R. AXELROD, supra note 84, at 129-32 (discussing
the enhancement of cooperation through increased interaction); see also Posner, supra note 69,
at 1574 (suggesting that interdependent pricing could result without collusion where only three
producers are selling a completely standardized product to a multitude of small buyers);
MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 20, at 20,563 (noting that factors which tend to increase
chances of tacit or overt collusion are high market concentration and entry barriers, homogeneous products, good price information flow, and frequent sales in which dollar amounts are
small).
93. See, e.g., United States v. General Elec. Co., 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 61,660
(E.D. Pa. 1977) (customized electric turbine generators).
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law clearly forbids contracts expressly creating cartels, contracts as
well as other devices, may be used, either consciously or inadvertently, to create the sufficient certainty necessary to transform an
intermediate market into a market with interdependence.94 These
contracts and other devices are termed facilitating practices, and are
discussed in detail in the next section.
B.

Theory of FacilitatingPractices

Certain practices can move oligopoly markets with barriers to
entry closer to interdependence. These practices are often called "facilitating practices," 9 5 and move oligopoly markets closer to a condition of interdependence by producing one of two effects-information exchange or incentive management.96 Although
particular practices often combine elements of both information exchange and incentive management, it is useful to distinguish between
them.97
Information exchange facilitates both explicit and tacit coordination by oligopolists through eliminating uncertainty about competitors' actions. 98 Examples of information exchanges include interseller price verification of price quotations and advance notice of price
changes.9 9 An example of interseller price verification of price quotations occurred in United States v. Container Corp. of America,10 0
where the Court inferred an agreement by manufacturers to inform
competitors, if asked, of price quotes made to particular customers. 10 1 An example of advance notice of price changes occurred in In
re Ethyl Corp., 0 2 where defendants announced price increases
through the newspaper. 0 3 In the situations of both interseller price
verification and advance notice, the exchange of information elimi94. See Salop, supra note 7, at 265. Facilitating practices also assist parties in agreeing
to and reaching the cartel price. See id. at 271-73 (discussing facilitating practices).
95. Facilitating practices are those business practices which companies can adopt unilaterally, and which can increase the likelihood of anticompetitive results. 6 P. AREEDA, supra
note 8, T 1436a, at 237; see also Salop, supra note 7, at 271-273 (defining "facilitating practices" as conscious or fortuitous means to implement restructured pay-offs that facilitate the
achievement and maintenance of the cooperative result).
96. Salop, supra note 7, at 271.

97. Id.
98. Id.
99.
100.
101.
102.
729 F.2d
103.

Id.
393 U.S. 333 (1969).
Id. at 336-37.
101 F.T.C. 425 (1983), rev'd sub nom. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. FTC,
128 (2d Cir. 1984).
101 F.T.C. at 626-28.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol17/iss3/3

18

Simons: Fixing Price with Your Victim: Efficiency and Collusion with Comp

1989]

PRICING CLAUSES

nates lags in the detection of cheating and allows cartel members to
react more rapidly. 104 By allowing faster reaction, the information
exchange makes cheating less profitable, and, therefore, makes it
easier to achieve and maintain the cartel price.' 05 Additionally, the
advance notification of price changes eliminates the risk that the
price leader will lose profits while it is ahead of the pack. 06
In oligopoly markets, the incentive management role of facilitating practices is to directly alter incentives, which can be accomplished in two ways. 0 7 A facilitating practice may be adopted because it alters the payoffs to competitors of various types of
conduct. 108 Similarly, a firm may change its own incentives from
matching price changes to initiating such changes. The best example
of the incentive management device would be a penalty for discounts. 09 For example, suppose manufacturers have contracts with
buyers which require a specific payment to those buyers if the manufacturer offers discounts to other buyers on subsequent sales. That
penalty payment makes it more expensive for the manufacturers to
cut price, and, therefore, alters the incentives to offer those
discounts.
C. Competitor-basedFormula Pricing Clauses as Facilitating
Devices
Competitor-based formula pricing clauses are capable of facilitating collusion between sellers as well as buyers. They do so by exerting both information exchange and incentive management effects
in a variety of ways depending upon the type of clause in question.
The clauses, however, are able to exert such effects only in instances
where they alter the incentives of buyers or sellers in price setting.
For example, in a competitive market, where buyers and sellers are
price takers, an individual firm or a small group of firms cannot affect price and the clauses can have no anticompetitive effect. In oligopoly markets with barriers to entry, on the other hand, when an
individual seller or a small group of sellers can cause prices to rise
by restricting output or where an individual buyer or a small group
of buyers can cause prices to fall by restricting purchases, the
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109-

Salop, supra note 7, at 271.
Id. at 271-72.
See id.
Id. at 272.
Id.
Id.
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clauses can have an anticompetitive effect. Accordingly, it is under
these conditions that the competitor-based formula pricing clauses
will be analyzed.110 Although there are numerous variants, only two
types of clauses will be analyzed: (1) clauses that peg the contract
price to the spot market, and (2) most-favored-nation clauses
(MFNs)."'1 This analysis is followed by a discussion describing some

formal economic models and experiments concerning various competitor-based formula pricing clauses.
1. Spot Market Price Clauses.- In industries that have spot
markets, or some type of central market exchange, long-term con-

tract prices may be tied to spot market prices. Such arrangements
can permit market forces to influence the non-market transactions
occurring under long-term contracts, and simultaneously to maintain
the parties' incentives to behave efficiently. 12 Where, however, one
of the parties to the contract can affect price through individual action, moral hazard problems arise." 3 The facts of United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co."" illustrate this phenomenon.
In Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., the defendant major oil companies
(the "Majors") maintained long-term supply contracts with wholesalers, which pegged the price of any particular oil shipment to the
prevailing spot market price."15 The Majors also sold gasoline on a
110. The use of these clauses by a monopolist is beyond the scope of this Article.
111. The framework for analyzing other competitor-based formula pricing clauses
should be identical, although working through the details of the analysis for some could be
much more intricate than the examples which follow in the text. A skeletal outline of the
difficulties in analyzing meeting competition clauses should confirm this conclusion.
In many industries where MCCs are pervasive, it is common for buyers to deal with
multiple suppliers, and it is usually the case that suppliers deal with numerous buyers. Additionally, buyers often have MFNs as well as MCCs. Under these circumstances, if one seller
offers a lower price to a particularcustomer (i.e. not to all of its customers), that customer
will then demand a lower price under the MCCs it has with other suppliers. If another buyer
has an MFN in its contract with one of those other suppliers, that supplier will then have to
lower its price to the second customer. And if that customer has an MCC with the first supplier, that supplier will then have to lower its price to this customer as well. Evidently, the
exact incentives created by these contract clauses vary greatly depending on who has which
kinds of clauses and which customers deal with which suppliers. In general, however, a selective price cut can come back to haunt a supplier under these circumstances. The fact that a
selective price cut to one customer may require similar cuts to some or all of the firm's remaining customers increases incentives not to make the price reductions in the first place.
112. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
114. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
115. Id. at 193-94. To be precise, no central exchange existed. Rather, the spot price
was defined based on an average quote appearing in a trade journal. Id. This distinction, however, is insignificant for the purposes of this Article.
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spot basis, although most of the spot sales were made by independent
refiners." 6 In the early 1930's, the supply of oil was so great that
117
market prices were less than the out-of-pocket cost of production.
Yet production could not be abandoned because, once production
ceased, surface changes would have made it difficult or impossible to
bring wells back into production. 1 8 Since the refiners did not have
regular outlets for their gasoline, they had to sell on the spot market
at "distress" prices, which brought spot prices to extremely low
levels."x 9 As a result, the Majors received low prices for their gasoline sold under long-term contracts as well as for that gasoline sold
on a spot basis. 20
To remedy the situation, the Majors conspired with each other
to purchase gasoline from the independent refiners at the "fair going
market price."'' Each of the Majors was assigned a "dancing partner," an independent refiner or group of independents from which to
purchase distress gasoline. 22 Through these purchases, the Majors
succeeded in raising the spot market prices12 3 and, as a result, the
prices they received from their wholesalers under the long-term contracts also increased. 24
The Majors had to conspire in order to raise the spot market
price. The spot market was most likely relatively competitive as
there were many sellers and buyers, none individually constituting a
substantial share of the market. 125 Accordingly, no one refiner or
small group of refiners could significantly influence the prevailing
price and a conspiracy to manipulate prices was necessary to bring
about the desired effect. Under such circumstances, the competitorbased formula pricing clauses alone would not have been anticompetitive. It was the conspiracy among the competing oil companies, not
the clauses in those companies' customer contracts, that was the predominant cause of the increase in prices.
Suppose the facts were slightly altered. Assume the Majors accounted for a significant percentage, for example, ninety percent, of
116.
117.
118,
119.
120,
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 194 n.39.
Id. at 171.
Id. at 170.
ld. at 171-74.
See id.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 179-81.
Id. at 195-97.
Id. at 198-200.
See id. at 169.
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sales made on a spot basis, and that there were only three major oil
companies, each with thirty percent of the market. Assume further
that barriers to the entry of new competitors were high. Under such
circumstances, the spot market would come close to approaching the
conditions necessary for interdependence: few firms would control
most of the production of a relatively homogeneous product, and
transaction prices would be widely and rapidly known within the industry. Under such conditions, each of the major oil companies
might be able to raise the market price by restricting its output because each firm accounts for a large percentage of total market production. In addition, cheating would be relatively easy to detect because the product is homogeneous, and increases in output would
cause an immediate and obvious price decrease. These conditions,
however, might not be sufficient to permit pricing at supracompetitive levels because the incentives to cheat could still be too great.
Next, consider the sales occurring under long-term contracts
containing competitor-based formula pricing clauses that peg the
contract price to spot market sales. Each major oil company would
have a significant amount of sales taking place pursuant to these
contracts in which the price is governed by the spot market price.
Thus, if the spot price were to rise, the Majors would stand to benefit substantially because contract prices would also rise. In essence,
the presence of these clauses adds to the previously existing incentive
of the Majors to restrict output in the spot market. Any benefit that
previously accrued from restricting output in the spot market would
be now increased, by a factor representing the additional gain resulting from the increased long-term contract prices. In addition, the
gains from cheating would be lessened. A company that expands
output will cause spot prices to drop and, as a result, the company
will receive lower prices from its wholesalers who are already under
contract.
Therefore, competitor-based formula pricing clauses would create both incentive management and information exchange effects.
Incentive management effects would occur because the clauses directly alter the payoff to each of the Majors from restricting or expanding output.'26 Information exchange effects would be present
because each seller knows its rivals are less likely to cheat as a result
of the clauses. Depending on the market structure and the strength
126. See Salop, supra note 7, at 271-72. To the extent that each company realizes that
the incentives of its rivals are altered, the incentive to restrict output is even greater because it
is more likely that rivals will follow suit. Id.
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of the incentives, supracompetitive pricing may be achieved without
the need for any overt collusion. 27 The clauses are able to have such
an effect because the competitor-based formula pricing clause relies
on an index, namely, the spot market price, to determine the contract price. This index can be influenced by the action of individual
or small groups of sellers. Since the spot market price index is under
the control of the sellers, a moral hazard problem is created and the
sellers' incentives are improperly altered.
Whether supracompetitive pricing results depends on the extent
to which an individual producer or group of producers can affect
price'28 and on the magnitude of the incentive to restrict output
caused by clauses. Both of these factors are interrelated. For firms
that are almost interdependent, incentives must only be slightly altered. The further firms are from interdependence, however, the
more incentives must be altered to permit interdependent pricing.
Thus, there can be no hard and fast rules to determine when the
clauses will produce an anticompetitive effect.
2. Most-Favored-Nation Clauses.- In industries where no central exchange or spot market is available, prices paid to the seller or
prices paid by the buyer may suffice as a proxy for the market price.
This method is manifested in the use of most-favored-nation clauses.
Generally, these clauses only allow the contract price to fluctuate in
one direction because the shifting of risk is usually involved. For ease
of exposition, however, this Article first considers the case where the
price for any shipment under the contract is the most recent price
offered by the seller to another buyer. That is, price can fluctuate
either upward or downward depending on prices offered by the seller
to other buyers.
Once again, the Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. hypothetical proves
helpful. Assume a market where some sales are made on a spot basis, but no central exchange exists and transactions prices are not
readily available. All other sales are made under long-term contracts
127. See Boise Cascade Corp., 91 F.T.C. 1 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980). It should be noted that anticompetitive
effects are possible where less than all firms use the clauses. Depending on the degree of interdependence already existing in the market, anticompetitive effects should be theoretically possible where 50% or less of the market is subject to the clauses. Boise Cascade, for example,

involved plywood manufacturers who accounted for approximately 50% of southern plywood
production. Id at 14. Nonetheless, they adopted a freight pricing scheme which resulted in
anticompetitive pricing behavior. Id. at 73-76.

128.

Generally, when a firm's market share is great and the the elasticity of demand for

its product is small, the firm has an enhanced ability to affect price by altering its output.
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which tie the contract price to the most recent spot price paid by the
seller. As previouly assumed, there are three large sellers, each with
thirty percent of all wholesale gasoline revenues.
The long-term contract price is again based on an index over
which the seller maintains some control. Accordingly, moral hazard
problems arise here as well. Since the long-term contract price depends on those sales made on a spot basis, the seller has an added
incentive to restrict production in spot sales. In addition, since increased sales on a spot basis can cause lower prices under both those
transactions and the long-term contracts, the seller has an added incentive not to increase sales made on a spot basis. In essence, the
effect on seller incentives is the same under this scenario as under
the example in which the contract price is tied to the spot market.
Next, consider the more typical MFN clauses where risk shifting occurs. 29 Assume that the wholesalers are risk averse and want
to avoid future price increases, but still desire the benefits of future
decreases. Under such an arrangement, an initial contract price is
agreed upon and, in addition, the seller promises to lower the contract price should he offer a lower price to a subsequent buyer.
As with the previous example, the seller maintains control over
the index upon which the contract price is based and similar moral
hazard problems result. In this example, however, the long-term contract price can fluctuate only in one direction, downward. That is,
when the seller restricts output and the prevailing price rises, there is
no concurrent effect on buyers who are already bound by long-term
contracts. Thus, this MFN provides no additional incentives to restrict output. However, since the lowering of initial prices to new
long-term purchasers or the lowering of prices to short-term purchasers will simultaneously result in lower prices for those buyers who
are already subject to long-term contracts, the increased incentive
not to lower price and expand output remains. Thus, this MFN provides additional incentives to resist an expansion of output, but not
direct incentives to contract output from the current level.
Therefore, supracompetitive prices generally could result from
this type of MFN where costs decline or if another mechanism facilitates a price increase. It is possible, however, that the existence of
MFNs will also make firms more likely to raise prices above competitive levels. If MFNs increase the likelihood that a price increase will
129. Risk shifting can similarly occur under contracts pegging the contract price to the
spot market. The analysis is generally the same as for MFNs. See supra note I l1.
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be followed, then firms may be more likely to attempt price increases
in the presence of MFNs. The MFN's ability to raise prices to, or
maintain prices at, supracompetitive levels will depend on the two
interrelated factors: (1) the magnitude of the incentive not to cut
prices caused by the MFN, and (2) the level of interdependence inherent in the existing market structure.
3. Formal Economic Models and Experiments.- Even though
the use of competitor-based formula pricing clauses is widespread,
there has been little economic research on their effects. The little
work that has been done in this area unanimously indicates that the
clauses can facilitate coordinated pricing above competitive levels. I
am aware of two papers establishing formal economic models within
which to analyze most-favored-nation clauses, 130 and one paper establishing a formal model for meeting competition clauses.' In addition, some experimental research has been done which reaches sim132
ilar conclusions.
Professors Holt and Scheffman have created a model based on
the Ethyl case.13 3 Their model provides for a homogeneous product,
most-favored-nation clauses, meet or release clauses, and advance
price announcements.1 3 4 They conclude that the use of these competitor-based formula pricing clauses in this context can result in list
and transactions prices that are significantly above the competitive
1 35
level.
Professor Cooper models a duopoly with differentiated products.' 36 He demonstrates in this context that MFNs, even if adopted
competitive level and
by only one firm, can raise price above 3the
7
firms.1
both
for
profits
generate monopoly
Terrence Belton examines MCCs and, more generally, competitor-based formula pricing clauses.' 8 He also models a duopoly with
differentiated products and concludes that the use of these clauses by
only one firm can raise price above competitive levels under certain
130. See Cooper, supra note 16; Holt & Scheffman, FacilitatingPractices: The Effects
of Advance Notice and Best-Price Policies, 18 RAND J. ECON. 187 (1987).
131. See T. Belton, A Model of Duopoly and Meeting or Beating Competition (Feb.
1984) (unpublished manuscript) (on file at Hofstra Law Review).
132. See Grether & Plott, The Effects of Market Practices in Oligopolistic Markets:
An Experimental Examination of the Ethyl Case, 22 ECON. INQUIRY 479 (1985).
133. See Holt & Scheffman, supra note 130, at 188.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 195-96.
136. Cooper, supra note 16, at 378.

137.

Id. at 387.

138.

Belton, supra note 131.
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conditions.13 9
Professors Grether and Plott conducted laboratory experiments
using students and businessmen to simulate buyers and sellers in a
market similar to that present in In re Ethyl Corp.4 0 In their experiments, buyers and sellers were constrained by most-favored-nation
clauses and other market characteristics of the anti-knock compound
industry. " " The experiments yielded results showing prices significantly above the competitive level and much higher than prices occurring under control conditions. 2 Under control treatment, MFNs,
delivered pricing, and advance announcement were 4eliminated
and
3
prices remained very close to the competitive levels.
Thus, there is support in economic theory and through economic
laboratory experiments for the conclusion that competitor-based
formula pricing clauses can facilitate pricing above competitive
levels. The work done to date indicates that the clauses are capable
of having anticompetitive effects in duopolies or oligopolies, which is
consistent with the present analysis. 4
4. Externalities: Why Buyers Desire Competitor-based Formula
Pricing Clauses.- The previous section concluded that under certain
conditions competitor-based formula pricing clauses can have significant anticompetitive effects. " 5 If buyers are aware of these possible
effects, then why do they consent to the clauses? The answer lies in
the fact that the clauses create externalities. In other words, the
clauses impose a cost on third parties that the contracting parties do
not fully consider when executing their contract.
Each individual buyer may desire the clauses for several possible reasons-risk sharing, delay of consumer search, and protection
against competitive disadvantage. Consumers will desire the clauses
139. Id. at 29-30.
140. See Grether & Plott, supra note 132, at 482-88; cf. In re Ethyl Corp., 101 F.T.C.
425, 425 (1983) (detailing the present market conditions), rev'd sub nom. E.I. DuPont De
Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984).
141. Grether & Plott, supra note 132, at 499.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. At least one empirical study of most-favored nation clauses has been done suggesting that, on balance, the clauses are efficiency enhancing. See Mulherin, supra note 34, at
113-15. Mulherin hypothesizes that the larger the number of pipelines, the more difficult it is
to collude and the more facilitating practices are necessary for collusive pricing to result. Id. at
113. Mulherin then suggests that the most-favored-nation clauses would appear more often in
less concentrated markets if market power were the primary explanation for their existence.
He ultimately rejects that conclusion, however, since the clauses are more prevalent in markets
with higher concentration. Id.
145. See supra notes 130-44 and accompanying text.
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for these reasons even in light of the fact that industry-wide use of
the clauses has the effect of raising prices. The reason that buyers
consent to or even pay for the clauses, in spite of the anticompetitive
effect, is that the individual contracting buyer feels only a small part
of that cost. When a buyer adopts the clause, he insures himself
against price reduction and prevents competitors from obtaining better prices.
At the same time, adopting the clause hurts the contracting
buyer by putting the industry on the road to market-wide adoption
of the clauses and high prices. That harm, however, is mostly an
external cost-it affects the market as a whole and is spread over all
buyers. The buyer adopting the clause only incurs a small part of the
cost and receives all of the benefits from risk sharing and protection
from competitive disadvantage.
Moreover, the clauses only have an anticompetitive effect when
a sufficient number of buyers and sellers adopt the clauses. Thus, for
the buyers who enter into contracts containing the clauses early on,
the possibility of an anticompetitive effect is remote while the benefits from the clauses are immediate. For buyers adopting the clauses
where they are already in use by a significant percentage of the market, the need to insure against paying higher prices than their competitors, who are already afforded the protection by the clauses, may
compel these subsequent buyers to adopt the clauses for insurance
against competitive disadvantage, in spite of the anticompetitive effect. Additionally, it is difficult for individual buyers to determine
the number of buyers who must adopt the clauses in order to create
the necessary degree of interdependence.
The problem could be resolved if the buyers could get together
and agree to refrain from entering into contracts with competitorbased formula pricing clauses. However, transaction costs and the
presence of free-rider problems prevent the viability of such agreements. The buyers may feel that competitor-based formula pricing
clauses, absent anticompetitive effects, provide the best method to
achieve the desired goals, and since it is not necessary for every
buyer to join the agreement in order to prevent an anticompetitive
result, each buyer will have an incentive to adopt the clause and let
every other buyer refrain from adopting the clause. That is, each
buyer has an incentive to "free-ride" on the other buyers. Thus, the
individual contracting buyer will adopt the clause since the benefits
to him exceed the costs.
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LEGAL ANALYSIS

This Section discusses whether contracts containing competitor
based formula pricing clauses unreasonably restrain trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 1 46 To prove a violation of the
Sherman Act, the plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of an
agreement 47 and that the anticompetitive effects of that agreement
outweigh the procompetitive effects.148 The agreement requirement
can be satisfied by proving a horizontal agreement between competitors.' 9 In some cases, the existence of a vertical contract will
suffice.'
As a general matter, it is not possible to prove a horizontal
agreement with respect to the use of competitor-based formula pricing clauses, since the clauses facilitate collusion and create efficiencies at the same time.' 5 ' The vertical contract between the buyer and
seller, however, should meet the agreement requirement, although
some may argue that a horizontal contract or conspiracy is necessary.1 52 In addition, the possibility of deeming interdependent pricing
itself as the agreement, a suggestion made by Judge Posner' 5 3 and
Professor Turner,15 4 is examined .155 The analysis then proceeds to
the rule of reason, concluding that under certain conditions the
146. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
147. E.g. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 335 (1969).
148. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688-89
(1978); United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1370 (5th Cir. 1980). The
requirements outlined in the text compose what is known as the rule of reason analysis. See id.
In contrast to that approach, the courts have determined that some business relationships are
per se violations of the Sherman Act and do not require a consideration of their procompetitive
and anticompetitive effects. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 607
(1972). The rationale for the per se rule is that certain agreements have severe anticompetitive
effects and little or no redeeming value. Thus, rather than waste the court's resources with
consideration of costs and benefits of the agreements, they are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable restraints. Id. It is, however, only after considerable experience with a type of
agreement that courts classify them as per se violations. See id. at 607-08. Courts should be
expected to use the rule of reason analysis and not classify agreements as per Se violations,
since courts have not had significant exposure to competitor-based formula pricing clauses and
the clauses generally have redeeming value. Additionally, the clauses provide efficiencies in
many cases and should not automatically be presumed to be anticompetitive.
149. See Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. at 609.
150. See FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 395 (1953).
151. See infra notes 158-68 and accompanying text.
152. See infra notes 175-205 and accompanying text.
153. See Posner, supra note 69, at 1575, 1605.
154. See Turner, supra note 83, at 667.
155. See infra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
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clauses do violate the Sherman Act. 56
A.

Agreement Requirement

Assuming there is no direct evidence of a horizontal agreement
between sellers (to assume otherwise would be to assume away the

problem), a plaintiff must prove a horizontal agreement by inference, 157 or by demonstrating that the vertical contract between the
buyer and the seller is sufficient for Sherman Act purposes. The case
of horizontal agreement is addressed first.
1. Horizontal Agreement.- A strong inference of horizontal
conspiracy is created where parallel conduct (the adoption of the
clauses in this case) is contrary to the independent self-interest of
those engaging in the parallel conduct. 58 Indeed, some courts have
held that this factor alone is sufficient to survive a motion for directed verdict.' 5 Other courts have required a showing that the par-

allel action is contrary to independent self-interest and, in addition,
that a motivation to enter the agreement be present. 6 0 Other fac-

tors, termed "plus factors," may add to the inference of an agreement. ' These include the presence of a highly concentrated market, 6 2 meetings between industry leaders,

information

exchanges, 6

63

certain types of price

raising price when surplus exists, 6 5 identi-

156. See infra notes 206-13 and accompanying text.
157. See United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 335 (1969); id. at
340 (Marshall, J., dissenting); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 808-10
(1946).
158. Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., 192 F.2d 579, 583 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
929 (1952).
159. See, e.g., Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877, 884 (8th
Cir. 1978) (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 279-80 (1968)); Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 84-85 (9th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
160. See, e.g., Schoenkopf v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 637 F.2d 205, 208
(3d Cir. 1980); Venzie Corp. v. United States Mineral Prods. Co., 521 F.2d 1309, 1314 (3d
Cir. 1975).
161. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 139 n.10 (2d Cir. 1984);
Wilcox Development Co. v. First Interstate Bank, 1985-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 66,412, at
65,059 (D. Or. 1985).
162. See Morton Salt Co. v. United States, 235 F.2d 573, 577 (10th Cir. 1956). The
Tenth Circuit observed that "the presence of only a few friendly sellers and the stable demand
for the product present a great opportunity and temptation to combine to maintain prices at an
artificially high level profitable to all." Id.
163. See Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383, 388 (6th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 260
F.2d 397, 400 (4th Cir. 1958), aff'd, 360 U.S. 395 (1959).
164. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978). In
markets with many sellers, the exchange of price information may reduce the dispersion of
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competition,16 and
cal price responses to increased and 1decreased
67
product.
the
artificially standardizing
For purposes of this analysis, however, no "plus factors" other
than the existence of the clauses are assumed. Thus, a plaintiff
would have to demonstrate that use of the clauses is contrary to each

firm's independent self-interest. In some cases, claims that the firm
adopted the clause because of legitimate business reasons may not be
possible. In such instances, the use of the clauses would be deemed

by the courts contrary to independent self-interest and a conspiracy
would be inferred. However, since there are generally several sub-

stantial and legitimate business reasons for adopting the clauses, the
mere fact that the clauses exist in a contract is not sufficient evidence by which one could infer that a horizontal agreement exists.'" 8
Due to the presence of the externality, it is in the self-interest of
both buyers and sellers to adopt the clauses despite their anticompe-

titive effects. Thus, the plaintiff would not be able to show that adoption of the clauses alone is contrary to independent self-interest.
2. Interdependence as Horizontal Agreement.- Two prominent
prices caused by inadequate knowledge, and, therefore, improve competition. Where there are
few sellers, however, it is easier to keep tabs on the pricing of rivals, lessening the problem of
inadequate knowledge. Therefore, the inference that the exchange of price information is
sought to facilitate collusion is stronger in markets with few sellers. R. POSNER, ANTITRUST
LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPEC'TIV 65-66 (1976).
165. See C-0 Two Fire Equipment Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 497 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 892 (1952). General microeconomic theory dictates that in competitive
markets, prices should decline in the presence of a surplus. Thus, a price rise when a surplus
exists may imply manipulation of normal market forces.
166. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 805-07 (1946). A note
of caution is appropriate here. Economists generally expect firms to respond to short-run excess
capacity by lowering price to short-run marginal cost. Thus, it may be a legitimate competitive
response to lower price when new or existing competitors expand their output and create excess
capacity. Moreover, when excess capacity is reduced through exit or a reduction in output,
price would be expected to move back toward average total cost. Thus, unless the price cuts
persist into the long run, this behavior may be entirely legitimate business conduct.
Although short-run marginal cost may be greater than long-run marginal cost under some
circumstances, this is usually not the case where excess capacity exists. Capital must be replaced in the long run, even if it is costless in the short run due to the existence of excess
capacity. Short-run considerations, on the other hand, generally involve only variable costs.
167. R. POSNER, supra note 164, at 59-60. It is easier to agree on price for homogeneous
products. If products in a particular market differ greatly-custom made items, for example-it will be impossible to agree on a single price that would apply to all orders. The sellers
would have to agree on a complex formula to account for the differences, which is difficult to
do without overt agreement. Id. Additionally, cartel members would have problems detecting
cheaters because of the uncertainty of the proper cartel price. Id. at 60. As a result, artificial
standardization may indicate an attempt to form cartels. Id.
168. See Wilcox Dev. Co. v. First Interstate Bank, 1985-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 66,412,
at 65,059 (D. Or. 1985).
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antitrust scholars, Judge Posner and Professor Donald Turner, have
approached the question of horizontal agreement from a slightly different perspective. Judge Posner argues that interdependent pricing
is itself an agreement for Sherman Act purposes. He observes:
It must be emphasized that tacit collusion is not an unconscious
state. If the firm's sales manager recommends that the firm offer a
wider variety of products in order to exploit consumer demand
more effectively, and the financial vice president recommends
against that course on the ground that it will make it more difficult
for the industry to maintain 'healthy' prices, the president can be
in no doubt of the significance of his actions if he adopts the financial vice president's recommendation. 69
Judge Posner concludes that this approach is consistent with precedent since evidence of high profits and market power should merely
be used as plus factors to infer a conspiracy.170
Professor Turner also concludes that interdependent pricing
constitutes an agreement, but he would not deem the agreement unlawful.17 1 He argues that interdependent pricing cannot practically
be enjoined, 7 2 and concludes that the only adequate relief is structural reformation of the industry, which indicates that the conduct of
the firms was not at fault, but rather the industry structure itself.173
He agrees, however, that interdependent pricing, accompanied by facilitating practices, should be unlawful and the facilitating practices
should be enjoined. 7 4
Although an unlawful agreement could be inferred from interdependence accompanied by facilitating practices under these approaches, neither is completely satisfactory. Professor Turner suggests that an agreement may be inferred from interdependent pricing
whenever it is accompanied by a facilitating practice that could be
enjoined. However, where there is no agreement to engage in such
practices, there seems to be no rational basis to conclude that there
is an agreement among competitors distinct from the interdependent
pricing itself.
Judge Posner's approach is also unsatisfactory because interdependent pricing alone should be tolerated for the same reason that
169.

R. POSNER, supra note 164, at 74-75.

170. Id. at 71-74.
171. See Turner, supra note 83, at 671-72.
172. Id. at 670.
173. Id. at 669-71.
174. Id. at 673.
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monopoly pricing is tolerated by lawful monopolists. That is, since
firms are encouraged to engage in competition so that only the efficient firms will survive and flourish, consumers will be able to
purchase products at the lowest prices and best quality. If one firm is
much more efficient than others in its production of goods, that firm
should not be penalized for its success. Such a penalty would be a
deterrent to competition generally, which is motivated by the possibility of obtaining high profits through production of better products.
This policy should be no different if three firms, rather than one,
achieve a higher level of efficiency and success in a particular
market.
It is unwise, therefore, to infer that an agreement exists which
violates the Sherman Act based on interdependent pricing alone.
Furthermore, there does not appear to be a logical way to infer an
agreement merely from unilaterally initiated practices that simultaneously generate efficiencies and offseting anticompetitive effects.
3. The Vertical Contract as an Agreement.- Section 1 of the
Sherman Act speaks explicitly to "contracts". 175 It does not limit or
qualify that term to mean only horizontal relationships. Many antitrust lawyers and scholars, however, associate the term "contract" in
section 1 primarily with horizontal contracts or conspiracies.,
There is no apparent rational basis to limit application of the term in
such a way, and, therefore, vertical contracts should meet the agreement requirement of section 1 as well. 177
Generally, vertical restraint cases under section 1 involve either
some type of horizontal conspiracy or a monopoly." 8 Usually either
a conspiracy exists between two parties at the same level of production, or one of the parties is a monopolist or exercises market
power.1 79 Most vertical restraint cases thus involve one of the two
following scenarios: (1) a vertical contract which, in structural
terms, resembles a hub with two or more spokes emanating from
it,180 or (2) a vertical agreement where one of the parties exercises
175. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982); see supra note 2 (setting forth § I of the Sherman Act).
176. See, e.g., FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 395 (1953);
6 P. AREEDA, supra note 8, 1 1402, at 9-16.
177. This possibility is suggested by Professor Areeda. See id. 1 1435 at 231-34.
178. See 7 P. AREEDA, supra note 8, 1 1437, at 3-6.
179. Id.
180. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (manufacturer imposed non-price territorial restrictions on dealers); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D.
Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (manufacturer had resale price maintenance agreements with retailers); see also 6 P. AREEDA, supra note 8, 1 1402b4, at 15-16 (noting that
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market power or where a combination of competitors monopolizes or
exercises market power over a product.'' In the first scenario, the
cases normally involve a horizontal conspiracy between companies at
the ends of the spokes-for example, two distributors using the manufacturer to set retail prices. The second scenario involves monopoly
power. This is not to say, however, that vertical arrangements, absent horizontal conspiracy or monopoly power in one of the parties,
cannot unreasonably restrain trade in the same manner as horizontal
combinations. Additionally, it cannot be assumed that a horizontal
combination or monopoly is necessary to meet the agreement requirement of section 1.
Theoretically, it should make no difference whether one of the
parties is a monopolist, whether two or more parties are on the same
level of production, or whether neither is true. Rather, the significant
fact is the existence of a contract creating anticompetitive effects.
Furthermore, whether a particular contract causes anticompetitive
results must be analyzed with the other conditions of the market as a
constant or given. The Supreme Court's most widely quoted formulation of the rule of reason provides:
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test
of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regu-

lates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is
such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine
that question the court must ordinarilyconsider the facts peculiar
to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition

before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. 82
Courts, therefore, should ask whether a contract is anticompetitive
given the other conditions in the market. This should include the
existence of similar contracts made by competitors with their own
customers or suppliers. 83
typical vertical cases involve restricted distribution, tying, and exclusive dealing).
181. See United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912); North Am. Soccer
League v. National Football League, Inc., 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1074 (1982); Hecht v. Pro-Football, 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956
(1978).
182. Id. (emphasis added).
183. I am aware of no policy basis for limiting agreements for Sherman Act purposes
only to horizontal relationships. Although arguments have been made in favor of the agreement requirement itself, see E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 140-41
(2d Cir. 1984); 6 P. AREEDA, supra note 8, %1402a, at 9-12, those arguments are equally
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Two Supreme Court cases are particularly instructive. In FTC
v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 84 the defendant produced
and distributed advertisement films to be shown in movie theaters in
twenty-seven states.'8 5 Defendant had contracts with the theater
owners that ran for up to five years, and many contracts prohibited
the contracting theater from displaying any other advertising
films. 8 6 The defendant's exclusive contracts tied up forty percent of
the market; the contracts of other distributors foreclosed another
thirty-five percent of the market.187 The Court found that the industry-wide practice of exclusive contracts that had "sewed up a market
so tightly for the benefit of a few falls within the prohibitions of the
Sherman Act" and was therefore a violation of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. 88 The Court did not mention conspiracy between
the purchasers of the films. The Court, in finding illegality, relied on
the existence of similar contracts which foreclosed an additional
thirty-five percent of the market. 8 9 Without this additional foreclosure, the defendant's contracts would not have had a sufficient effect
to constitute a violation of the Sherman Act.
In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 90 Standard Oil, the largest seller of gasoline in the western United States, maintained exclusive dealing contracts with independent service stations requiring
them to exclusively sell Standard Oil's gasoline. 19' These contracts
tied up only sixteen percent of retail outlets in the market. 19 However, other producers, as well as company-owned service stations,
were parties to similar exclusive dealing contracts. 9 3 As a result,
only 1.6 percent of the retail outlets were "split pump."' 4 The Court
found that Standard Oil's contracts violated section 3 of the Clayton
applicable to vertical contracts.
184. 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
185. Id. at 393.

186.

Id.

187.

Id.

188.

Id. at 395. Although the majority opinion clearly found no need for a horizontal

conspiracy to support the § 1 violation, Justice Frankfurter, in his dissent, argued that the
vertical contracts were not sufficient and that a horizontal conspiracy among the film distributors was necessary. Id. at 399-400 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). It should be noted that although the case was brought under the FTC Act, the Court found illegality based on a viola-

tion of the Sherman Act. See id. at 395.
189.
190.

Id. at 393.
337 U.S. 293 (1949).

191.

Id. at 295-96.

192.
193.
194.

Id. at 295.
Id.
Id.
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Act and emphasized the importance of similar contracts by Standard
Oil's competitors:
When it is remembered that all the other major suppliers have also
been using requirements contracts, and when it is noted that the
relative share of the business which fell to each has remained about
the same during the period of their use, it would not be farfetched
to infer that their effect has been to enable the established suppliers individually to maintain their own standing and at the same
time collectively, even though not collusively, to prevent a late arrival from wrestling away more than an insignificant portion of the
market.' 95
Although this case involved the Clayton Act, one can see that the
analysis is identical to that of Motion Picture Advertising,9 ' which
found a section 1 violation for a similar type of conduct.' 97
In addition, it is axiomatic that vertical agreements may be
struck down because of their horizontal effect, as established by the
Supreme Court in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons
Co. "98
' The Dr. Miles Company manufactured a proprietary medicine
and fixed the wholesale and retail prices to prevent department
stores from selling the product at discount prices. 99 The company
did so through its contracts with wholesalers, and through wholesalers' contracts with retailers.2 00 The cut-rate prices allegedly confused
customers and injured Dr. Miles' reputation. 20 1 The Court struck
down Dr. Miles' system of contracts and noted that since these vertical contracts with wholesale and retail dealers established a horizontally fixed price, Dr. Miles could have fared no better with its plan
of identical contracts than the dealers themselves would have had
they formed a combination and endeavored to establish the same restrictions-all to achieve the same price-fixing results by agreements
with each other. 2
195. Id. at 309 (footnote omitted).
196. 344 U.S. 392 (1953); see supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text (discussing
the case).
197. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 304a, at 6-7 (1978) (arguing
that there should be no distinction between § I of the Sherman Act and § 3 of the Clayton

Act); Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 676 F.2d 1291, 1303 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1009 (1982).
198.

220 U.S. 373 (1911).

199. Id. at
200. Id. at
201. Id. at
202. Id. at

394.
396.
375.
407-08.
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The difference between the contracts in Dr. Miles Medical Co.
and contracts with a competitor-based formula pricing clause is that
the latter may affect price at the manufacturer level, while the Dr.

Miles Medical Co. contracts fixed price at the retail level. There is
no reason, however, why this distinction should be material for pur-

poses of this Article.
The Dr. Miles Medical Co. per se ban on resale price maintenance has been continually upheld.2 03 The cases have not questioned

the concept that vertical contracts producing horizontal effects are
within the reach of the Sherman Act. Nonprice vertical contracts
have also been struck down,"04 but are judged under the rule of reason approach.2 0 5 Thus, vertical contracts having horizontal effects in
either the upstream or downstream market should meet the agreement requirement of section 1 of the Sherman Act.

B. Rule of Reason Analysis
The rule of reason requires us to examine the procompetitive
and anticompetitive effects of the clauses to determine if they unreasonably restrain trade. 08 Anticompetitive and procompetitive effects,
however, are not always capable of being precisely identified and
quantified. As a result, the courts apply appropriate economic theory

to the evidence presented in order to reach a conclusion as to the
likely actual effects in the case before them. 07
The clauses unreasonably restrain trade if their anticompetitive
effects outweigh their procompetitive effects, and, therefore, the rule
203. See, e.g., California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445
U.S. 97, 102-03 (1980) (observing that "[t]his Court has ruled consistently that resale price
maintenance illegally restrains trade .... ); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433
U.S. 36, 51 n. 18 (1977) (citing judicial and congressional approval of per se analysis in cases
of vertical price restoration).
204. See Eiberger v. Sony Corp., 622 F.2d 1068, 1081 (2d Cir. 1980).
205. See Continental T.V., 433 U.S. at 57-59; Eiberger,622 F.2d at 1075.
206. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
207. See United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969). In
Container Corp., the Court applied economic oligopoly pricing theory to the record to infer
anticompetitive effects of interseller price verification. Id. at 335-38. The defendants agreed to
tell competitors, if asked, price quotes made to particular customers. Id. at 336-37. The Court
concluded that since this information exchange occurred in a highly concentrated market with
homogeneous product and inelastic demand, "[t]he inferences are irresistible that the exchange of price information has had an anticompetitive effect in the industry, chilling the vigor
of price competition." Id. at 337. The probability that the exchange of price information led to
an unlawful effect on prices was adequately supported by the record. Id. at 339 (Fortas, J.,
concurring).
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of reason requires a balancing of the clauses' effects.2 ° Under this
analysis, the benefits obtained from the clauses by buyers, sellers,
and the economic advantages enjoyed by society as a whole must be
considered. In contrast, when attempting to infer a horizontal agreement through an analysis of whether adoption of the clauses was
contrary to independent action of the sellers, a consideration of the
benefits to the seller was the only relevant concern.
In a competitive market that is not protected by entry barriers,
competitor-based formula pricing clauses can have desirable efficiencies: (1) bringing the market forces to bear in nonmarket place
transactions, (2) risk sharing, (3) maintenances of incentives to minimize cost, and (4) encouragement of earlier purchase due to elimination of the risk of price change. The spot market price and the
prices charged by competitors provide an index that enables current
market forces to influence prices set under long-term contracts, while
still maintaining the proper economic incentives. The externalities
created by the clauses have, at most, only a minor effect in such
cases.
In contrast, in an oligopolistic market protected by entry barriers, the externalities may become significant when a substantial portion of the market becomes subject to these clauses. Under such circumstances, the economic properties of the clauses may change. If
the clauses become widespread and the index comes under the control of one or a small group of parties, the externality may create a
moral hazard problem which adversely alters the incentives for price
competition. Since the competitor-based formula pricing clauses are
designed to make long-term contract prices reflect the current competitive market place, that purpose would be frustrated in an oligopolistic market. If competition is not intense, the main purpose of the
clauses would be frustrated because the index used to determine the
contract price would not reflect a competitive market. Rather, the
clauses would facilitate coordinated pricing without the necessity of
a "smoke-filled room" conspiracy. Thus, the anticompetitive effects
would nullify this justification for entering into the clauses.
Further, the value of other efficiencies produced by the clauses
under competitive market conditions would be lessened in an oligopolistic market. Buyers, for example, may desire a meeting competition clause to protect against the possibility that prices will decline
after the contract is executed. Since these clauses not only facilitate
208.

United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1374-75 (5th Cir. 1980).
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maintenance of the current price level but also facilitate the achievement and maintenance of even higher price levels, the probability of
a price decline would be decreased. Consequently, insurance against
such price declines would be worth less.
With respect to the provision of insurance against competitive
disadvantage, the value of the clauses would also be reduced in an
oligopolistic market. Although competitors would each pay the same
price for the product, they would pay a higher price than they otherwise would in the absence of the clauses. This increase in cost would
be absorbed by the buyers themselves if they could not pass the cost
increase to their customers. Alternatively, if the buyers raise prices,
sales would decline unless demand for their product was perfectly
inelastic.
When balancing pro and anticompetitive effects under the rule
of reason, it is also appropriate to consider whether there are available alternative clauses that would exert a lesser restraint on competition. Indeed, there is a line of cases, beginning with United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,209 that suggests a restriction on competition can be upheld under the rule of reason only when it is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of legitimate business goals. 2 10
If less restrictive alternatives are available to satisfactorily accomplish the legitimate business goals at issue, it would seem that the
restraint in question cannot be "reasonably necessary," and should
be struck down.21 ' Other cases, however, suggest that use of the least
restrictive alternative is not necessary to avoid condemnation under
the Sherman Act, suggesting that the clauses would be lawful if they
were "fairly necessary. 2 12
In the instant case, the same goals sought to be achieved by
competitor-based formula pricing clauses-risk sharing, maintenance of incentives to minimize cost, and encouragement of earlier
purchases---can be achieved through the use of a cost index clause,
even in oligopolistic industries. The cost index clause, as discussed
209. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aft'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
210. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679
(1978); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); Realty Multi-List, Inc.,
629 F.2d at 1351.

211.

See Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934, 945-46 & n.6 (5th

Cir. 1975); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 51 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 955 (1972).
212. See. e.g., American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1248-49
(3d Cir. 1975) (quoting Anderson v. American Automobile Ass'n, 454 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th

Cir. 1972)).
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above, involves a price escalator provision which is triggered by a
cost index that is not under the seller's control, yet is highly correlated with the seller's costs. These clauses are efficient since they
allow the contracting parties, using cost as a proxy for price, to allocate the risk of price changes to the buyer and, simultaneously,
maintain the seller's incentive to minimize costs.
Although competitor-based formula pricing clauses take demand factors into account and accordingly provide a better proxy for
the competitive market price in an unconcentrated industry, this distinction disappears in situations where the clauses facilitate
supracompetitive pricing. The clauses do not properly account for
demand factors in such situations because the creation of interdependence permits the sellers to raise price above the point at which demand equals marginal cost. As a result, competitor-based formula
pricing clauses do not provide better proxies for the competitive market price than clauses based on cost indices in instances where
supracompetitive pricing results.
In contrast to competitor-based pricing clauses, however, the economic properties of the cost index clause do not change in oligopolistic markets. The purpose of this clause is not frustrated. In
oligopolistic markets the cost index escalator has superior properties
since the index is not under the seller's control and thus no adverse
incentives are created. The seller, therefore, has a greater incentive
to compete effectively. The cost index clause does not facilitate collusion, yet it provides the same benefits associated with competitorbased formula pricing clauses. In such case, competition-based
formula pricing clauses cannot be deemed even "fairly necessary."
Accordingly, where competitor-based formula pricing clauses exert
anticompetitive effects, those effects should swamp any procompetitive effects and the clauses should be struck down.21 3
VI.

THE ETHYL CASE

The only judicial body to correctly analyze competitor-based
formula pricing clauses has been the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), with its treatment of MFNs in the In re Ethyl Corp.1 4 Al213. Permitting recovery of treble damages, however, has an ironic result in this context.
Due to the existence of externalities, individual buyers are willing to pay a premium for the
clauses even though they result in supracompetitive prices. Thus, buyers could specifically demand the clauses and then turn around and sue for treble damages. This is a seemingly inequitable result.
214. 101 F.T.C. 592 (1983), rev'd sub nom. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. FTC,
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though the FTC evaluated Ethyl under the Federal Trade Commission Act and not the Sherman Act, its examination conforms to rule
of reason analysis.215 Aside from the agreement requirement issue,
the FTC's treatment of MFNs in Ethyl is consistent with the analysis proposed here.
In Ethyl, the FTC concluded that MFNs, when coupled with
other facilitating practices, enabled producers of anti-knock compound to raise the prices above the competitive level.2"' The FTC
held that the use of the clauses in conjunction with delivered pricing
and the advance announcement of price increases constituted a violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,2 17 and therefore enjoined the defendants from pursuing these practices. 218 As
discussed above, the FTC found a violation without ever attempting
to argue that an agreement, in any form, existed between
defendants.2"9
The FTC concluded that most-favored-nation clauses were
shown to affect pricing behavior, as evidenced by the producer's use
of the clauses as a rationale given to buyers for not offering lower
prices.220 Moreover, internal company documents and testimony
showed that DuPont and Ethyl, who accounted for seventy percent
of industry sales, were each influenced in pricing behavior by the
knowledge that the other used the clauses. 221 Thus, the FTC found
recorded evidence demonstrating that the MFNs exerted both incen729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984).
215. See id. at 593-94. In Ethyl, the FTC attempted to broaden its authority under § 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). It had already
been well settled that § 5 encompasses acts and practices that also violate the Sherman Act,
and there was also considerable dictum that § 5 covers acts and practices not reachable under

the Sherman Act. See id. at 593-99. The FTC attempted to make illegal under § 5 practices
that restrain trade without even alleging the existence of an appropriate contract, combination,
or conspiracy. See E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 140 (2d Cir. 1984).

The Second Circuit, in a less than compelling opinion, reversed the Commission primarily
because there was no showing of an appropriate contract or agreement, or lessening of competition. Id. at 142.
This Article analyzes competitor-based formula pricing clauses generally in the context of

the Sherman Act. Accordingly, the Article directly addresses the agreement requirement of §
1 of the Sherman Act and does not concern itself with the vagaries of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. For the most part, the Second Circuit's opinion in Ethyl is not relevant to
this discussion.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

101 F.T.C. at 639-40.
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
Ethyl, 101 F.T.C. at 653-55.
See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
Ethyl, 101 F.T.C. at 630.
Id. at 630-31.
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tive management and information exchange effects. 22 The FTC also
relied on the structure and performance of the industry in concluding the clauses were effective in facilitating coordinated pricing.223
With respect to efficiencies of MFNs, the FTC recognized the
existence of externalities and their relationship to efficiencies.224 Customers desired the MFNs primarily because they did not wish to be
at a price disadvantage in relation to their competitors.22 5 Thus, the
FTC observed that "this is a particularly good example of a practice
which may be desired by individual customers, viewed from their
limited perspective, while proving harmful to customers as a
class. '22 6 Given the existence of competitors with MFNs, individual
buyers desired the clause. 227 However, given a choice, each buyer
would have preferred that no one use the clauses.228
In declaring the MFNs and the other practices illegal, the FTC
applied a standard as stringent, if not more stringent, than that applied by courts in rule of reason cases under the Sherman Act.229
The FTC first looked to market structure and found high concentration, a homogeneous product, delivered pricing, and high barriers to
entry.230 It then assessed industry performance, finding excess profits
and prices above marginal cost.23 ' Finally, evidence of an actual effect on competition was present and there were no offsetting
efficiencies. 32
CONCLUSION

Competitor-based formula pricing clauses are in widespread use
in a variety of forms. In most cases, the clauses are efficient and
provide significant benefits to both buyers and sellers. In oligopolistic
markets with high entry barriers, however, the externalities inherent
in competitor-based formula pricing clauses can become significant
and adversely alter incentives for price competition. Where the
clauses have this effect of facilitating collusive pricing, they should
222.

Id. at 630.

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

631.
631-32.
632.

608-11.
608-09.
610-11.
651.
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be struck down as violative of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
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